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PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

THE THEORY OF VALUES

THE problem of values has been in the front ranks of the battle-line so persistently during recent years that it may seem desirable to let it rest in peace for a while. It has been attacked from all sides, and some claim to have vanquished it. It still seems to have some life, however; in fact, its very hardness invites attention. It is evidently a vital problem in current thought, and the events in Europe seem to have revived rather than extinguished its vitality.

The problem of goods, good and the Good, is an ancient one for philosophy, but it was not until comparatively recently that psychology became interested in it. Apparently it did not like the terms "good" and "goods," perhaps because of their metaphysical and theological connotations, perhaps because of their "objectivity," so it adopted and adapted terms which were better suited to its purposes, namely, "value" and "worth." Both of these terms and much of the psychological interest in them were derived from the economists, especially from those of the German psychological school. The economists in Germany who were interested in developing the relations of the so-called "subjective" elements to economical problems found the problem and theory of values and their relation to price, goods and utility a fertile field for psychological speculation; the problem soon outgrew the limitations of economics and was taken up by the psychologists proper, like Ehrenfels and Meinong. In the hands of the psychologists there soon sprang up a whole new vocabulary of values; we hear of "*Wertgefuehl*," "*Gefuehl des absolut Wertvollen*," "worth predicates." "value judgments," "worth experience."

Evidently, then, the problem of values arose quite independently of ethical theory. Ethical theory was at the time not very hospitable to the scientific methods which the psychologists were trying to introduce, nor were the psychologists very eager to become entangled in transcendentalism and its formal ethics. On both sides, therefore, there was a tendency to let each go his own way. The psychologists,

for example, not wishing to be mixed up with normative ethics, discovered the science of "axiology." After this parting of the ways, fortunately or unfortunately, the roads continued to diverge. Both ethics and psychology were apparently bound for the same place, the determination of human goods, but each claimed to know the way better than the other and so they parted. They have remained apart to the present day; the problem of values has remained for the most part an independent problem even in recent discussion. There are, however, signs to-day of a reconciliation.

Meanwhile the psychologists developed several theories of value, all more or less closely related because the same methods were employed. Ehrenfels and Meinong were the leaders in Germany, and in this country Professor Urban, whose book is the most available example of this method. The problem was attacked with the usual methods and aims of structural psychology. The first thing to do was to find a *basis* for values. It was evident that the basis was to be found in the "dispositional element," that is, in some mental element like feeling or desire. This fundamental element of values having been found, it remained to analyze the structural elements of value judgments, and the relation of these to the objects to which they referred. In short, the problem was one of analysis of structural elements of consciousness, of their combinations and relations.

Even in the more experimental methods a similar procedure was followed. Likes and dislikes, satisfactions and dissatisfactions, were taken as elements, abstracted from their natural environment, and discussed in their abstraction, but not *as* abstractions. The familiar experiments with judgments, especially "esthetic judgments," suffer from this abstraction, but more will be said of this later.

In contrast to this approach of the problem there came another with a different ring. There is something about the problem of values, and even about the term "value" itself, which makes one approach it with awe and reverence. There is something religious about it. One feels as though one were in the presence of something of the utmost importance. Of course there is imbedded in it all the enthusiasm which is evoked by such expressions as "The Supreme Good," "The Vocation of Man," and one can not help feeling a thrill, or at least a shiver, at expressions like "*der Begriff des absolut Wertvollen als Grundbegriff der Moralphilosophie.*" But this ethical enthusiasm is heightened by the religious sense of importance which hovers about "Value." This is evidenced by the keen interest which students of the philosophy and psychology of religion have taken in the problem. Religion, some say, is primarily a conserver of values. Psychologists of religion find it a valuable aid to point out the "im-

portance," the "value" of certain religious ideas; their "value" is often used as an apology for their crudity.

It will become evident later how natural this feeling of importance is to the problem of values, but what is significant here is that this appreciative attitude toward the problem of values was separated and made distinct from, and in a sense opposed to, a "descriptive" psychology, and sought as companions idealistic epistemology, absolutistic metaphysics, and theology. The analytic psychology with its splitting and resplitting, its abstractions and distractions, soon robbed the value concept of its glamour. It is therefore quite to be expected that the more appreciative interest in the problem, having been banished from psychology, should seek a more hospitable habitat. An example of this attitude is Professor Münsterberg's "*Philosophie der Werte*," otherwise known as "*The Eternal Values*." It is the old story of the flower, the botanist, and the artist: the botanist claims that he *really knows* the flower, which the artist immediately denies, and claims for himself. Professor Münsterberg is, however, more condescending. He recognizes the necessity of both approaches to the problem. Says he: "They supplement each other completely, representing the two fundamental aspects under which the problem of values can be studied. Professor Urban's work is positivistic and the other idealistic; the one therefore deals with the relativistic aspect of our values, the other with the values as absolute realities; the one is psychological, the other epistemological; the one analyzes and explains the facts, the other aims towards a teleological system."

A glance at the first page or two of Professor Münsterberg's *The Eternal Values* gives us the setting of the book. It begins:

"Is there anything in the world valuable in itself? That is our question. Of course there are many things which we value because you or I like them, or because they are useful for a certain purpose; they are helpful to us. But such values depend upon our special standpoint. A thing may be useful to me and useless to my neighbor. It may be agreeable to our social group, but disagreeable to other nations or to other ages. Even the truths of to-day were not the truths of yesterday and may not be valued as truth to-morrow. . . . Everything seems to depend on individual standpoints, upon individual desires. Truth is nothing but that which helps us to fulfil our purposes; beauty is nothing but that which appeals agreeably to our senses; morality is nothing but useful prescriptions which secure comfort for our particular social groups; religion is nothing but suggestions which give us hope. In short, our so-called values seem to be merely means to personal gratification, changing from

age to age, from people to people, from group to group, from man to man.

"Outspoken or not, that is the philosophical creed of the overwhelming majority of thinking persons to-day. The faithful believer, to be sure, feels that his religion really brings him in contact with something which is absolutely valuable. The moral man who sacrifices his life to follow the call of duty believes in his deepest heart that the moral deed is of absolute value. The artist who creates a thing of beauty imagines that his inspiration, too, opens to him a world of absolute values. The social reformer and the statesman, the pioneer and the captain of industry, when they work and fight for the progress of mankind, feel that the human advance is something absolutely valuable. The judge when he serves on the bench is filled with the belief that it is absolutely valuable to have justice prevail among men. And in the midst of his scholarly research the seeker for truth is indeed uplifted by the conviction that the full truth is something eternally valuable. But all these convictions and beliefs, these faiths and inspirations, must fade away, it seems, as soon as the philosopher begins to examine them. He shows that they are nothing but illusions which pleasantly deceive the striving men, and that in reality no absolute values exist. Everything is relative, everything is good only for a certain purpose, for a certain time, for a certain group, for a certain individual. Goodness and beauty and progress and peace and religion and truth merely have pragmatic value. They help us to our personal ends. Our ideals and our lives are of no value in themselves. What we dream of eternal values should simply be explained psychologically like the fancies of a fairy-tale. Philosophical skepticism and relativism are thus the last word, and their answer harmonizes with a thousand disorganizing tendencies of our time" (pp. 1-2).

I have quoted at some length, because these passages seem to me to give the setting not only of this book, but of much recent discussion in general. We find the contrast, so strikingly brought out here, constantly cropping out; it seems to be fundamentally the contrast of the "states-of-consciousness" psychology *versus* metaphysical ethics. The most significant words in the above quotation are the "nothing but's" the "merely's"—"truth is *nothing but* that which helps us fulfil our purposes; values are *merely* means of personal gratification; goodness and beauty and progress and peace and religion and truth *merely* have pragmatic value." Psychology and empiricism have to bear the odium of the "merely" and the "nothing but."

Now this odium has rebounded with considerable force upon the absolutists. It is now not surprising to hear of "nothing but abso-

lute," "merely static," "merely eternal" values. This turn has been accomplished largely at the hands of the functional psychology and pragmatism, and has meant a bringing together again of ethics and psychology with relation to the problem of values. It has meant a fresh working out of the problem in terms neither of abstracted mental elements nor in terms of idealistic sentimentality, but in terms of activity as conditioned by natural and social environment. Functional psychology is antithetical, on the one hand, to the structural, states-of-consciousness psychology, and on the other to "eternal" absolutism. It demonstrates the fact that the approaches of Münsterberg and Urban are not the only two and complementary approaches. By refusing to separate the internal and external worlds by a stone wall it is forced to deal neither with "merely personal satisfactions" nor with "eternal absolutes."

The contributions of this new approach to the theory of values are significant and far-reaching. I shall attempt in the following pages to gather together a few of the suggestions and results of recent discussions which seem to mark decided advances in the theory of values, and which promise to be fruitful in the future.

Let me first suggest that we think of the adjective "valuable" as primary and not the noun "value." Values occur in nature, as the chemist might say, in the adjectival form "valuable," as attributes of objects. The noun most immediately derived from the adjective would be "a valuable," *i. e.*, we might call objects which possess the quality "valuable" "valuables." Then we might speak of the quality "valuable" abstractly and call the quality "value," just as we derive hardness from hard, and whiteness from white. The term "value" in this sense, as an abstract noun (valuableness), denotes a quality; or, as Aristotle would say, it is not an *οὐσία*, but a *ποιότης*. But current usage has also identified the term "values" with "valuables," so that one can often hardly tell which of the two meanings is employed, and considerable confusion has resulted. It is rather difficult to see how one could speak of values in the plural in the sense of "valuableness" unless one were speaking of different kinds of value quality. On the whole, I think, the term "value," when used concretely (a value, values, *etc.*), is used in the sense of "something valuable," "a valuable object." I shall attempt to keep this distinction, and where I do not substitute the terms "valuables" or "valuableness" the context will, I hope, make clear whether the term is used concretely or abstractly.

The next question is: How do objects become valuable? or to put it in a less misleading form: How do valuables come to be? We might expect to find the simplest occurrences of values in the simplest forms of nature, in inorganic nature. We might, for example,

speak of the sun as valuable for warming a stone, *i. e.*, from the standpoint of warm-stone the sun is valuable in so far as it can warm the stone. Similarly we might speak of any cause as valuable for producing the effect which it can produce under certain circumstances. But here we are speaking of value in the very broad sense of potentiality. Anything is valuable with respect to its possibilities under changed circumstances. We can at least say that without change value would be impossible; but I think if we examine the situation more closely, we will find another element. An object must be valuable not only *for* something, but *to* something, or better said, in order that an object become valuable for something it must be valuable to something. To return to our illustration, unless there is a situation in which the stone exists as to-be-warmed there can be no value of the sun as a stone-warming object. If value is to be predicated of the sun as a stone-warming object, it must be valuable to some such situation. Now we can search inorganic, lifeless nature high and low and not find such a situation. The stone simply is; it is not *for* anything. It is not to-be-warmed any more than it is to-be-broken. Inorganic nature seems to be indifferent to values. It is only when we put the stone and sun in relation to some activity in which the stone functions as something-to-be-warmed that the sun becomes a possessor of value.

When we turn to organic nature, to organisms, we find such activity. We find objects grouping themselves with reference to the plant or the animal as valuable or not valuable for carrying on certain activities. Carbon dioxide becomes valuable *to* the plant *for* making food. The plant by virtue of its being an organism which carries on selective activity has created a situation to which valuables are relevant, and just as natural as they are relevant.

The same sort of situation confronts us when we turn to human nature-values. We have here selective activity of the most complex type. We have active interests, tendencies, desires, conations, adaptations, call them what you will, directed toward definite ends. Things are known, acquire meaning, as furthering or thwarting these interests; goods and bads, valuables and not-valuables are the result. Functional psychology and pragmatist logic have made us so familiar with this conception that it is useless to dwell on it here.

The value situation, then, consists of (1) a valuable object, (2) an organism or activity to which it is valuable (or by which it is valued), (3) an end or purpose for which, with a reference to which it is valuable.

All three of these factors seem to me to be essential to the value situation; and yet even a summary review of the leading theories of value reveals the fact that it has been customary to neglect one or

more of these factors in dealing with the value situation, and the methods and results have been warped accordingly. The subjective idealists and introspective psychologists found values to be products of human consciousness, determined by human desire and feeling. The other factors of the situation were straightway forgotten and discussion centered upon the mental content of the value-judgment. Valuation *per se* was studied; the object valued, the specific end for which it was valued were deemed irrelevant or even non-existent. Immediately the cry of "relativism and subjectivism!" was raised by the absolute idealists and the realists. We must have independent values. This led to an over-emphasis of the valuable objects as independent of human wants and interests. And thus the dispute over the objectivity *versus* the subjectivity of values was carried on, a duplicate of the dispute over qualities. Of course human values are relative to human activity and desire, but that is no ground for despising them as *merely* subjective. Would irrelevant, or, to put it a little stronger, irrelevant values be any better? Of course values are objective, both in that they are *of objects* and in that they are controlling and guiding factors of human experience; but why should value, therefore, be an eternal quality of certain objects independently of the relations of these objects to practical situations? There is no need of dealing with values in terms of subject and object. If only values were taken as they occur naturally, specifically, and practically, much useless discussion might be avoided.

On the side of experimental psychology there has been a similar failure to take in the whole situation. For the purposes of experimentation certain factors of the value situation have been selected and others rejected as irrelevant, and so the results of the experiments have been misleading, or at least unilluminating. Most of the experiments on judgments of evaluation have had to do with so-called esthetic values, judgments of likes and dislikes, agreeableness and disagreeableness. The subject is required to arrange in order of merit a number of colors, figures, sounds, anything. The question to be asked is: Is it pleasing or displeasing? Which is more satisfactory? Which do you like better? *etc.* But supposing the subject should ask: "Better for what?" "Which is more pleasing, scarlet or drab?" "Pleasing for what? for a house, for a dress, for a sunset or for a bedroom?" "No matter," the experimenter would say, "not pleasing for anything in particular, just pleasing in general." But are things pleasing or displeasing, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, likable or not, *just in general*? Are not these judgments in practise relevant to a particular situation? Genuine evaluations are never made "in general"; the values always refer to

something specific, they are valuable *for* something. And so to ask: Which of these is more valuable? without saying *valuable for what*, is embarrassing to say the least. It robs the valuation of all its genuineness. It may be possible to tabulate the results of these experiments and get certain correlations and agreements, but do they indicate anything significant about values? This abstraction of valuation is characteristic of practically all of the experimental study of judgments of evaluation and renders them of little significance for the study of values and valuation as they really occur. The same method has been applied to determining the relative value of different types of values, but more will be said of this later.

The present need is that psychology study values at home, in their natural and specific situations. They can not be rightly studied as abstractions; they must be studied in their functional relationships, and this involves a study of all three factors of the value situation in their proper and specific relations.

With this conception, then, value appears essentially as that quality of an object by virtue of which it becomes a means to an end. Now means and end are relative terms. The same thing may be viewed now as means, now as end; when viewed as means it is valuable in so far forth. This relation of means to end implies selective activity. In inorganic nature and the lower forms of life we see ends, if we may call them so, or potentialities realized directly and without mediation. Means and end are fused into potentiality, and from the point of view of actuality, to use Aristotelian terminology, this potentiality may be called valuable in a very broad sense, as we saw before. But in the higher forms of life and especially in man, ends and means become constantly more and more distinguished. The more purposive activity becomes the more mediate it becomes. Means are not only increased in number, but are made more refined and subtle. Herein, we might say, lies the whole history and progress of mankind. This whole process of increased consistency and refined purposiveness of activity means a multiplying and manifold of value situations. For the complexity of human values is produced not so much by the multiplication of ends as by the multiplication of means for attaining ends, or, more accurately, by the transformation of ends into means. Primitive nature reveals a multitude of potentialities actualized, but there is little coordination of these processes, there is no way in which the actualization of potentialities can be made cumulative. But in human activity we have a very advanced type of cumulative activity; one end is made to serve another; values are organized and made to serve a common purpose. In other words, in the passage from primitive nature to

human nature, the "valuable *to*" and the "valuable *for*" elements in the value situation become increasingly separate and distinct.

The question arises here: Are not ends as ends valuable? Must we not predicate value of those things after which we strive just because we strive after them? Are not human ends goods in themselves? It has been frequently maintained and is still widely held that that is just what constitutes values and goods, that they are good-in-themselves, valuable *per se*. That is, for instance, Münsterberg's contention, as we saw. "Is there anything in the world valuable in itself?" And accordingly his list of eternal values includes things, persons, valuations, nature, history, *etc.* To some minds this would seem far too pluralistic; they would find *The Eternal Value*. At any rate, the search for the highest good has been a favorite sport among philosophers ever since the days of Aristotle.

Aristotle, it seems, knew what he was talking about. He tells us a good is that at which a thing aims: health is the good of medicine, a ship the good of the ship-building art; well-being, welfare, is accordingly the good of man, as social being, and since this includes all that aims at a good in the most general sense he calls it *the Good*, the thing aimed at *par excellence*. Now that is all very clean-cut and intelligible. But when Aquinas and Kant and Mill and the others began talking about good and *the Good*, it meant an entirely different thing, and when they tried the same trick, apparently, that Aristotle did, it didn't work very well. The trouble was that they were speaking of a different kind of good. For instance, the utilitarian good, to which we may confine ourselves for the present purpose, is not "that at which a thing aims," but "that which is useful." Goods in this sense, that which is useful, we have called values, valuables.

Now it is of this kind of goods that men have asked: What is the supreme Good? or as they say now, the highest Value? Let us see what the implications of this conception are. We might speak of the highest value empirically, *i. e.*, it might be possible theoretically to compare all valuables and to arrange them in order of merit according to their comparative value in all kinds of situations, the number of situations in which they are valuable, *etc.* The one which came out at the top of the list might be called the highest value. But no one ever tried to arrive at a highest value of this sort, for not only would it be practically impossible, but there would be no motive for finding it. For it would in no sense be absolute or eternal, since with changing situations it might be superseded; nor would it be valuable *par excellence* in every situation, since in any specific situa-

tion another object might be more valuable. No, the highest value is not highest in this sense; it is highest in that it is absolutely, eternally, independently valuable. For our conception of values this implies that the highest value would have to be of the greatest value for anything to anybody in any situation. What sort of a thing might answer to this description might be interesting for speculation, but what concerns us here is that if there should be such a supreme value its claim must rest upon an empirical basis, and this is *prima facie* impossible; for who would attempt to analyze all or even approximately all possible situations in which values arise, in the hope of finding some value universally greater than any other? The same is true of any number of such eternal values. Of course love, happiness, loyalty, reason, anything may be hypostatized as values, but that is not very good psychology. These may be significant as motives, interests, or ends, but they are not for that reason eternal values, nor values at all. It is difficult for me to imagine just what is meant when ends as ends are spoken of as values. They don't seem to come under the value category. It is conceivable that human ends might be viewed as useful, as means, by some other kind of experience like that of a bird or of the absolute, for instance; but within the realm of human experience it is only as our ends are viewed as capable of leading to something else, some further human end, that value can be predicated of them. Thus we might grant that well-being is the chief good, that at which all things aim, but *as such* it need not be *the* or even *a* value. It may be invaluable, but not valuable.

The great objection which lies at the heart of all opponents to relative values is that relativity furnishes no criterion of judgment between true and false valuations. If values are relative to human desire, any desired object is a value, apparent values are called true; black is made white, evil is called good, and "all's well with the world." Hence the "merely" which is attached to the term "relative" signifies not only philosophic scorn, but moral indignation. In order to vindicate, if possible, the character of the relativist let us see whether and how he distinguishes true from apparent values. The relativist would reply to the absolutist by asking: How else could the truth of a valuation be established except by relating it to a specific situation and judging its adequacy to fulfil its function in it? In other words, value can be apparent or genuine only with relation to experience and in experience, and it is precisely because the relativist is interested in putting values to work and thus testing them, that he makes human values relative to and relevant to human experience. Relativism does not imply identification of the desired and the desirable. If an object desired as a value turns out upon reflection or experience to fail to measure up to the situation, it is

recognized as valued falsely. Strictly speaking values, like facts, are neither true nor false, they simply *are*; it is valuation which is true or false. The details of the verification of valuations need not be discussed here, as they have been emphasized by pragmatism in connection with the general theory of truth and thought. It need merely be pointed out that the critique of valuation is ultimately the business of intelligence applied concretely. Only with the growth of intelligence and intelligent discrimination can valuation become more accurate and efficient. There is no ready-made, universal, *a priori* touchstone which can be applied for judging values; there is no short-cut to truth. Genuineness of valuation must be discovered by constant mental labor.

The establishing and relating of *types of values* has always been one of the most vital aspects of the problem of values. The traditional types are economic, ethical, esthetic, religious, logical, biological, and perhaps one or two more. It is not easy to make out the psychology of this differentiation of values. There seems to be a trace of the old faculty psychology in it; one might say religious values are the object of the religious faculty, esthetic values of the esthetic faculty, *etc.* It is quite easy to see how economic values came to be regarded as a distinct type, for the economists were among the first to become interested in the problem of values. The value of the economists came to be expressed in terms of exchange, and was thus differentiated from the others. As to the other types, they seem to have originated by each of the branches of philosophic study, ethics, esthetics, *etc.*, claiming a value all its own. In whatever way these types may have come about, it is quite evident that not much psychology is at the bottom of the classification.

Attempts have been made by experimental and other methods to make a scale of human values. The experimental method usually consists in asking a large number of persons which they would rather be: a thief, a dunce, a pauper, an infidel, a recluse, a dullard, or a corpse. The answers are tabulated and an "empirical scale of values" results. This is the same method as the pleasant-unpleasant order of merit method mentioned above, and deserves the same criticism. The values are abstracted from their natural setting and then arranged as a scale in their abstraction. A scientific, psychological classification of values has not been worked out and can not be attempted here. But disregarding for the present the traditional types, we may gather some light on the problem from our analysis of the value situation.

Now it will be evident that we could classify values from the three different standpoints. First of all we might distinguish different kinds of valuables, *i. e.*, the kind of objects which may have the value quality. From this standpoint we might reach some such

classification as the following: (1) Physical Objects, *e. g.*, tools, food, clothes, pianos, rosaries. (2) Concepts or Mental Processes, *e. g.*, the recalling of a name, the hearing of a symphony, the thought of home, the hope of heaven. (3) Activities, such as earning money, singing a song, taking a walk. The second might be classed under the third. (4) Social Institutions, *e. g.*, a family, a government, a convention. We might keep on, but a shorter way of saying all this would be to say that any kind of thing whatsoever could conceivably be valuable in some situation or other.

Secondly we might classify values according to the things to which they are referred. From this standpoint we could distinguish between (1) Plant values, objects valuable to plants: (2) Animal values. Under and above animal values we would put (3) Human values: and of these we might distinguish between (a) Individual values, objects viewed as valuable to an individual, (b) Social or institutional values, those valuable to a society or institution as such. At this point some would no doubt add Absolute values, objects valuable to an absolute experience, *etc.* But we shall be more modest, and confine ourselves to the types of terrestrial values.

Then there is a third standpoint from which values might be classified, namely, that of the purpose or end *for* which a thing is valuable. But here we come upon a diversity which practically defies classification. The ends for which things are valuable are specific ends. It is meaningless to attempt to classify the ends of activity on any other than a specific basis; ends simply do not exist *ueberhaupt*. To speak of the ends of activities in a general way, *ueberhaupt*, with reference to values, is meaningless, and yet this is usually at the basis of the traditional classifications. To attempt a classification of the ends of actions specifically is, if not wholly impracticable, at least beyond the scope of this paper.

There is still another standpoint which may be adopted for distinguishing types of value, and this is, I think, the standpoint adopted by the traditional classification; at least it represents what the traditional classification aims to do, or is thought to aim to do. We may attempt to classify values in the abstract, not concrete values; *i. e.*, instead of classifying valuables, classifying types of value quality. Economic value and religious value are supposed to designate different *kinds of value quality*. What has been described as the value situation, they tell us, represents but one kind of value, "merely" utilitarian value. There is, they say, for example, also value *per se*, things valuable in themselves. This is a different kind of value quality. Its objects are valuable not because they are useful, but because they simply are valuable. Thus, they say, it is possible to distinguish types of value quality, like the colors of the spectrum. My objection to this is that there is a tendency and a danger to rob

the term "value" of its definitive meaning; the meaning of "value" is stretched unduly and made to embrace meanings which are not native to it. The original distinctions are not kept in mind and the term becomes meaningless.

Enough has been said in the way of tentative classification of values to bring out one point, and that is the most significant for our present purposes, namely, that the one way to distinguish types of values is to distinguish functions in specific value situations. Anything may be any kind of a value, depending on its function in a specific situation. Types of values can not be distinguished absolutely and independently of circumstances, nor can anything be assigned to one type of value universally. Values are by nature particular and can not be classified abstractly without reference to specific situations.

The same criticism would apply to the more general classification of values as higher and lower. Religious, ethical, and esthetic values are usually called higher values, and the biological, *e. g.*, lower. But this absolute denomination of values as higher and lower is as impossible and as impractical as any absolute scale of values. The only possible intelligible meaning of highest or lowest value is the object which is most or least valuable, respectively, *in a given situation*. And so if we wish to speak of highest or higher values, we must qualify by saying, given a certain situation, experience and reflection show that *X* is of the highest value, or of higher value than *Y*.

We can not leave the subject without indicating the problem of values as standards and controlling agencies of human conduct. That values control our conduct is not a moral ideal, but an empirical fact. But it is quite as evident that the valuations which govern our conduct are for the most part made *for* us, not *by* us, *i. e.*, they are factors in our social environment, rather than products of our individual intellectual discrimination. Now since social valuations are usually the products of chance and circumstance, and not of intelligent discrimination, it follows that social valuations are not necessarily the best attainable. The moral problem of values is, then, to develop accuracy of valuation, to organize values for greater effectiveness, to put values to work with a view to discovering and utilizing the knowledge thus gained. Social arrangements and organizations must seek to profit by the values which intelligence discovers; values must be constantly adapted to the fulfilment of human needs and purposes. This, we saw, is the business of intelligence constantly and concretely applied. And this takes us back to the educational problem, that of developing in the individual skill and accuracy of intellectual discrimination. Education must not merely impress and impose on the individual ready-made social valuations as standards; it must seek to develop in him the technique of true valuation. Society must not

be content to conserve its existing law and order by means of education; it must seek to make the fruits of education the means for its progress.

We have seen how the psychology of values emerged as an attempt to develop a scientific theory of human goods over against the absolutistic ethical theory. We have sketched its progress and noted its social significance. It has served the cause of progress; it has emphasized the need for revaluation and reorganization of social activities. We have also seen how, on the other hand, the psychology of values has been pressed into service to bolster up the very thing to which it constituted a reaction. Certain values have been apotheosized and given absolute significance; they are viewed as things to be conserved. The plea here is that the psychology of values should not turn traitor to its own cause by becoming a conservative and conservator. A scientific psychology must realize that when it is dealing with values it is dealing with progressive forces. Values are instruments of progress, and without change in the direction of progress they lose their function and meaning. A value is not an absolute unchanging piece of reality, but a characteristic of nature by means of which organic activity is made possible and carried to its perfection.

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BEHAVIORISM AND GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

I HAVE been asked to review the new edition of Hobhouse's *Mind in Evolution*.¹ I shall attempt to do so by describing my reaction to the psychological situation in which Thorndike,² Hobhouse,³ and Watson⁴ are centers of widely influential initiative.

When, in 1901, Hobhouse's book was published, I was a behaviorist of the Watsonian variety, for I considered introspection a futile method and attention to the subjective unfavorable to the progress of natural science. In the development of the science of behavior (since called by Watson behaviorism) along narrowly biological lines, I foresaw the progress of psychology. I must have felt quite as con-

¹ L. T. Hobhouse. *Mind in Evolution*, London, Macmillan and Company, 1915. Pp. xix + 469. Second edition, revised and enlarged. The first edition of the work appeared in 1901.

² E. L. Thorndike. *Animal Intelligence*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1911. This book contains the author's chief contributions to comparative psychology.

³ *Development and Purpose* as well as *Mind in Evolution*.

⁴ J. B. Watson. *Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1914.